"A Primer on Plan Mexico," Americas Policy Program Special Report
A Primer on Plan Mexico
The Bush Administration Has Put Its "
Laura Carlsen | May 5, 2008
On Oct. 22, 2007 President Bush announced the $1.4 billion dollar "
Soon the U.S. Congress will vote on the initiative, popularly referred to as "Plan
Over half of the packet would go to Mexican military and police forces accused of documented and yet legally unresolved human rights violations. At the same time, no money is allotted for drug treatment and harm reduction in either country, and the colossal "cooperation" package completely ignores the serious problems that exist within the
This aid packet would place the
To begin a public debate on the dangers inherent in Plan
What is Plan
The request for fiscal year 2008 for $550 million has been attached to the Iraq Supplemental Appropriations Bill, to be voted on in Congress in the coming weeks. Fifty million dollars are earmarked for Central America, while the remaining half-billion goes to
Although the proposal has not been presented to the public in the
Under the rubric of "Counter Narcotics, Counter Terrorism, and Border Security" the initiative would allocate $205.5 million for the Mexican Armed Forces. Over 40% of the entire packet goes to defense companies for the purchase of eight Bell helicopters (at $13 million each, with training, maintenance, and special equipment) for the Mexican Army and two CASA 235 maritime patrol planes (at $50 million each, with maintenance) for the country's navy.
Most of the $132.5 million allocated to Mexican law enforcement agencies also lines the pockets of defense companies for purchase of surveillance, inspection, and security equipment, and training. The Mexican Federal Police Force receives most of this funding, with Customs, Immigration, and Communications receiving the remainder.
The rest of the 2008 appropriations request is comprised of $112 million in the "Rule of Law" category for the Mexican Attorney General's Office and the criminal justice system. This money is earmarked for software and training in case-tracking and centralizing data. The initiative would also give $12.9 million to the infamous Mexican Intelligence Service (CISEN) for investigations, forensics equipment, counterterrorism work, and to other agencies including the Migration Institute for establishment of a database on immigrants. The
The proposed 2009 budget of a reported $450 million to Mexico is much the same, with a larger share going to the police, assuming that by then the notorious corruption among those agencies will have been at least partially remedied-a dubious assumption at best ($120 million to the armed forces and $252 million to the police and other law enforcement agencies).
All of these programs are directed to the goals of supply interdiction, enforcement, and surveillance-including domestic spying-according to the "war on drugs" model developed in the United States in the early 70s under then-President Richard Nixon.(2) This military model has proved historically ineffective in achieving the goals of eliminating the illegal drug trade and decreasing organized crime, and closely related to an increase in violence, instability, and authoritarian presidential powers.
The NAFTA Connection
The "Merida Initiative" received its name from a meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderon in
With the emphasis on counter-narcotics efforts, in the lead-up to the October announcement of the package, both governments marshaled studies and statistics to support the contradictory thesis that drug-trafficking and related violence in Mexico had reached a crisis point, and that Calderon's offensive against the drug cartels was working.
This is not the real story of the plan's origins. The Bush administration's concept of a joint security strategy for
Through the SPP, the Bush administration has sought to push its North American trade partners into a common front that would assume shared responsibility for protecting the United States from terrorist threats, promoting and protecting the free-trade economic model, and bolstering U.S. global control, especially in Latin America where the State Department sees a growing threat due to the election of center-left governments. While international cooperation to confront terrorism is a laudable and necessary aim, the Bush national security strategy (5) entails serious violations of national sovereignty for its partner countries, increased risk of being targeted as U.S. military allies, and threats to civil liberties for citizens in all three countries.
Moreover the counterterrorism model, exemplified by the invasion of
Extending the concept of North American economic integration into national security matters through the closed-door SPP raises grave questions about how security is defined and who does the defining.
Thomas Shannon, sub-secretary of
"understands North America as a shared economic space and that as a shared economic space we need to protect it, and that we need to understand that we don't protect this economic space only at our frontiers, that it has to be protected more broadly throughout
North America. And as we have worked through the Security and Prosperity Partnership to improve our commercial and trading relationship, we have also worked to improve our security cooperation. To a certain extent, we're armoring NAFTA." 6
The SPP effort seeks to lock in policies that do not have consensus and have not been debated among the public and within Congress. Citizen groups in all three countries have called for a halt to SPP talks due to the lack of labor, environmental, and civilian representation, and transparency to the public. On the security front, the Bush administration's concept of military-based rather than diplomacy- and social policy-based security is strongly questioned in the
In this context, instead of reviewing policies and opening them up to public debate, the Bush administration has launched its boldest advance yet within the SPP context-Plan
It is important to understand the roots of Plan
What's Wrong with Plan
1. The "war on drugs" model doesn't work.
The Merida Initiative departs from the mistaken pretext that interdiction, enforcement, and prosecution will eventually stem illegal crossborder drug-trafficking. Studies have shown that treatment and rehabilitation are 20 times more effective in decreasing the illegal drug trade. (8) Yet the Merida Initiative contains not one penny (9) for treatment or rehabilitation in either country.
Working against the stated goal of decreasing the binational drug trade, the Bush administration recently cut back funds for domestic treatment and prevention programs. This approach moves in the wrong direction.
The supply-side model fails for one obvious reason: where there's a buyer there will be a seller. And since it's a black market, the seller must be a member of organized crime and stands to make an enormous, tax-free profit.
The experience of Plan Colombia reveals the pitfalls of the Plan Mexico now before Congress. Plan
Over the past seven years of Plan
As a result of crackdowns, drug cartels have adopted more sophisticated equipment and forms of organization-and closer relations with Mexican cartels. In a balloon effect, a new route opens up when an old one is closed off and new drug lords rise up through the ranks when existing leaders are imprisoned or killed.
In addition to its failure to detain drug production, processing, and transit of cocaine, Plan
With the arrival of arms and money for the Colombian armed forces, the violation of human rights, the displacement of entire communities, and assassination of civilians has become so widespread as to be alarming even to proponents of Plan
The upshot today is that a drug user has equal if not greater access to cocaine on the streets of
This experience should be carefully analyzed before replicating a failed model with heavy collateral damage to the social fabric of an allied nation. Although
2. Funding and equipping Mexican security forces in the current context of corruption and impunity will worsen the problems, reduce civil society's role in reform, and inhibit construction of democratic institutions.
Unfortunately, Mexican security forces are presently often more part of the problem than the solution. The State Department 2007 report on human rights (12) in
"Corruption continued to be a problem, as many police were involved in kidnapping, extortion, or providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of organized crime and drug traffickers. Impunity was pervasive to an extent that victims often refused to file complaints."
Ranking members of Mexican security forces on local and national levels maintain close links to drug traffickers, working for them directly in many parts of the country. The army has traditionally been more independent of this dynamic, but its deployment within the country in the drug war is increasing its involvement and leading to human rights violations. Many armed forces deserters, that totaled 17,000 last year alone, receive counternarcotics training and then pass it along in service to high-paying drug cartels. The infamous Zetas (a drug trafficking network comprised of former law enforcement and military agents) illustrate the lethal capacity of military-trained groups that operate with drug cartels.
Military equipment also ends up in the hands of the cartels. The U.S. Office of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms reports that 90% of arms decommissioned from organized crime in
By excluding community prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs, neighborhood watch initiatives, and other measures that create a more active role for civil society, the initiative tends to convert the citizenry into a protectorate of the armed forces. The redefinition of crime as a national security threat also removes it from the community realm.
The point is not to vilify the Mexican armed forces, police, and government. Many honest and brave individuals can be found among their ranks and some have given their lives fighting corruption. Extreme statements like that of Tom Tancredo on Nov. 8, 2007 who said, "The degree of corruption inside the government and the military is so great that it's hard to see where the government ends and where the cartels begin," respond more to a Mexico-bashing mentality than a serious concern for the real challenges Mexico faces.
But this is the reality of the situation and the challenge for
Some organizations have called for passing the Merida Initiative with a human rights certification process attached. These are contradictory aims since the plan itself will worsen human rights violations. Giving arms, military equipment, spy and surveillance capacity, and training to security forces with a history of abuses that the justice system is unable or unwilling to check is like pouring gas on a fire. Ignoring root causes of criminal activity and market demand makes it very likely that military aid will empower delinquency and feed corruption.
Human rights certification, while well-intentioned, has not worked in
The model of confronting the trafficking, sale, and consumption of drugs with military means increases violence and weakens democratic institutions. In countries where these are already weak it can create serious obstacles to a transition to democracy.
Former UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Louise Arbour warned of using the army in the streets on her last visit to
General José Francisco Gallardo, the major proponent of human rights guarantees within the Mexican Army and a constitutional scholar who was imprisoned for his efforts states,
"Here what should be done is to form a national police force that carries out these functions and is not under the military ... The presence of the army in matters that are not under their jurisdiction displaces the constitutional faculties of the civil, federal, state, and municipal authority and goes against Art. 21 of the constitution." (16)
When asked if the Calderon strategy of militarizing the drug war could lead to a return to the "Dirty War" of the 70s, Gallardo-as a young soldier, one of the few members of the armed forces to protest the torture and assassination that marked that period-told the author, "We are already experiencing a return to the Dirty War." (17) He cited the widespread practice of torture and arbitrary detentions as proof of systematic human rights violations in contemporary
The 2007 report of the Mexican National Commission on Human Rights (18) recommended the gradual withdrawal of the army from the internal drug war. Militarizing society by involving the army in internal functions beyond its constitutional mandate constitutes a threat to democracy. As is well known in
The corollary to increased military support in internal matters is the rise of uncontrolled paramilitary forces as has happened in
Both governments have been quick to defend the plan stating that no
However, the deployment of
Unless checks and balances appear that have so far not been revealed, Plan
4. Plan Mexico broadens Mexico's presidential powers, skewing a weak balance of powers.
The war on drugs model has always had this as an unspoken objective: to strengthen the executive power without effective counterbalances or transparency, subtracting powers from other levels of government and restricting citizen rights. (20) In
Since his hotly contested election by half a percentage point in 2006 and accusations of irregularities upheld in part by the electoral institutions, President Calderon faces a challenge to consolidate his rule.
After taking office Calderon rapidly built an image of strength in arms. He dispatched over 24,000 army troops to Mexican cities and villages, and created an elite corps of special forces under his direct supervision.
The message of a weak presidency bolstered by a strong alliance with the military has not been lost on Mexican citizens. While some believe this is the only way to attack public insecurity, others have criticized (21) the repressive undertones, the danger of returning to presidentialism, increasing human rights violations, constitutional questions, and threats to civil democratic institutions.
For the Bush administration the war on drugs model serves to lock in pro-corporate economic policies and
5. The war on drugs model invariably extends into repression of political opposition in countries where it has been applied, blurring the lines between the war on drugs, against terrorism, and against political opposition.
A 2004 report documents the impact of increased
"Too often in Latin America, when armies have focused on an internal enemy, the definition of enemies has included political opponents of the regime in power, even those working within the political system such as activists, independent journalists, labor organizers, or opposition political-party leaders." 22
Persecution of dissidents has been well-documented for many periods of Mexican history including present day. The International Civil Commission on Human Rights writes in its preliminary conclusions from a fact-finding tour in February 2008:
"There have been widespread arbitrary arrests of members of social movements and, on occasion, of members of their families merely for being related to them. It is normal for those who are arrested to be subjected to torture and physical abuse. To justify the arrests false evidence is used ..." 23
Journalists who report on state or drug-cartel related violence also become victims of selective silencing. The Committee to Protect Journalists lists
6. Plan Mexico indiscriminately replicates the Bush counter-terrorism model, placing at risk democratic institutions and civil and human rights in
Counter-terrorism measures included in Plan
Obliging Mexico to adopt emergency counter-terrorism measures including domestic surveillance, phone tapping, warrantless searches-the "Gestapo law" (which is how the Mexican news media refers to it) proposed by the Calderon government that was defeated by popular outcry-and definitions of social protest as a criminal activity could damage fragile civil liberties protections and democratic institutions. The Merida Initiative includes funding for espionage systems directed at national citizenry, and surveillance equipment. Reforms dictated under the SPP have authorized house arrest and other measures considered a violation of rights but common in the
By including "border security" and explicitly targeting "flows of illicit goods and persons," the initiative equates migrant workers with illegal contraband and terrorist threats. This ignores both the root causes of Mexican out-migration and the real demand for immigrant labor in the
The Merida Initiative Joint Statement (26) reads, "Our shared goal is to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to fight criminal organizations-so as to disrupt drug-trafficking (including precursor chemicals), weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking."
The millions of dollars allocated to the immigration institute are focused on tightening
Illegal immigration is not a problem that can be solved by draconian security measures. Our experience with militarized border security measures to date shows that they are extremely expensive, and the criminalization of immigrants leads to increased hostility and violence that erodes communities. The loss of labor also harms local businesses.
A better policy would recognize immigration as a result of economic integration and adjust trade, investment, and community development programs accordingly in both countries. Job generation, local infrastructure development, programs aimed at regulating migratory flows and preventing conflict would go much farther to enhance border security in the short and long term.
8. Reforming the Mexican justice and prison systems requires political will in Mexico, not
The $112 million allocated for 2008 in the "rule of law" portion of the Merida Initiative to the Attorney General's Office and other criminal justice agencies includes mostly information technology systems for centralizing data collection, forensics labs, and training for the court system and law enforcement personnel. Although viewed by some as the "soft" part of the initiative, these programs raise serious questions as to their efficacy and appropriateness.
First, to increase the "rule of law" what
Second, the Mexican laws and legal system are not the same as the
Several members of Congress have heralded the Merida Initiative as an unprecedented step toward binational cooperation. They argue that the
In fact, the plan places the onus of the drug war on Mexico and includes no counterpart measures to reduce the U.S. market, improve customs control on the northern side of the border, reduce retailing and distribution, eliminate illegal arms traffic, and prosecute money-laundering-all problems located firmly within the United States.
Moreover, although President Calderon has heralded the measure as an example that the
As some attack the plan for the resources destined to an "undeserving"
10. Plan Mexico violates Mexican sovereignty.
Mexicans have always been protective of Mexican sovereignty. U.S. government officials often regard Mexico's reticence to engage in joint military and police actions with the United States as if it were a hyper-nationalist flashback, but Mexico has guarded its neutrality in foreign affairs and public opinion views with skepticism of U.S. foreign policy, especially since the invasion of Iraq, with the majority preferring a degree of autonomy from U.S. security interests.
United States, completely funded by the Mexican government, will place Mexican drug enforcement agents in border customs offices and key points in the interior, including Laredo, KansasCity, Miami, and . A new wiretapping system, produced by SPY-MEX and supervised by Mexican intelligence officers, will monitor private communications of New York citizens suspected of involvement with organized crime, while Mexican-made planes overfly communities thought to be located along drug trafficking routes. The U.S. U.S.army, recently deployed to cities across the nation to fight the drug war, will receive arms and training from ." Mexico
Newspapers and blogs would explode with cries of a Mexican re-conquest and the sacrifice of
When in her testimony before Mexican Senate committees, Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa mentioned the counter-terrorism activities "to detect terrorists (29) who might try to attack our neighbor," her comments drew fire from legislators as proof that the
The role of private contractors in implementing the package remains unclear and a source of dismay. One security source says Blackwater will likely be the major beneficiary, despite its tarnished reputation following its shooting of Iraqi civilians. Corruption in contracts related to both training and equipment purchase seems a certainty given recent experience in
It also doesn't help that it was tacked on to the
For the Bush administration, Plan
The Bush administration has developed a with-us-or-against-us policy toward
The administration and the rightwing think tanks that have developed the strategy explicitly formulate hemispheric security policy in terms of
Stephen Johnson,(32) deputy assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere affairs in the Defense Department, recently made the connection between Plan Mexico and Washington's bid to recover its influence in a slipping geopolitical context.
"While a groundswell seems to exist for greater engagement with the
United States, there are challenge states such as Venezuela, Cuba, and to some extent Boliviaand . For now, Ecuador Venezuelaand Cubaare clearly hostile to the , western-style democracy, markets, and are actively trying to counter our influence. Our challenge is not to confront them directly, but instead do a better job working with our democratic allies and friendly neighbors." United States
Strong international relations should be based on mechanisms of cooperation between nations that have each established national security policies based on their own needs. What has legislators and civil society worried on both sides of the border is the reach of Plan
Opposition to Plan
Despite a lack of public information, many organizations have come out against the Merida Initiative. In addition to doubts about the efficacy of the war on drugs model for eliminating traffic in illegal drugs, one of the strongest and most frequent criticisms relates to the poor human rights record and corruption of the Mexican security forces that would directly receive the aid. Numerous human rights organizations on both sides of the border base their opposition to the plan on cases of blatant violations that have never been investigated or prosecuted in
1. In an April 30, 2008 letter to William Delahunt of the International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives, the AFL-CIO stated its opposition to the Merida Initiative, citing "systematic and often violent violations of core labor rights" and specifically naming two cases. The first is the assassination of the leader of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee in
The letter states, "Without significant and concrete improvements in institutional mechanisms to weed out criminals, provide training in human rights, and establish effective civilian oversight, additional funding to these security forces is likely to worsen corruption and violence."
2. In 2006 protests by citizens of the southern Mexico state of Oaxaca-including unionized teachers, students, indigenous peoples, and city-dwellers-were forcibly put down by state and federal security forces. Paramilitary groups and snipers for hire also participated in an orchestrated effort to defeat the movement to remove the state governor accused of fraud and violence, and improve working conditions for teachers and living conditions in the communities in which they work. Human rights organizations documented the murder of 23 persons, as well as numerous cases of abuse, torture, arbitrary detention, and wrongful imprisonment. The murder of movement leaders has continued to date and brought the death toll to 62, according to the International Civil Commission on Human Rights. (34) Among the dead was
Other high-profile cases include the Ciudad Juarez murders; the murders, and torture and rape of protestors in police custody in the farming community of San Salvador Atenco (35) in 2006; and journalist Lydia Cacho, who was arrested and threatened after writing a book that revealed the involvement of major industrialists and politicians in a pedophile ring.
Since being dispatched to wage the war on drugs, the Mexican Army has accumulated an alarming number of complaints of violations of human rights, including several incidents of fatal shootings at checkpoints, rapes, and brutality. The 2007 Mexico Human rights Report of the U.S. State Department (36) notes reports of security forces involvement in "unlawful killings by security forces; kidnappings, including by police; physical abuse; poor and overcrowded prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption, inefficiency, and lack of transparency in the judicial system; confessions coerced through physical abuse permitted as evidence in trials; ... corruption at all levels of government; ... violence, including killings, against women ...".
In February and March of 2008 the International Civil Commission on Human Rights investigated the status of human rights violations in the southern states of
"The CCIODH holds that the cases of
Atenco, Oaxaca, and exemplify a more widespread situation characterized by a pattern of continued and commonplace behavior on the part of different federal, state, and, in some cases, local authorities. This model of behavior can clearly be understood as the politics of the state." Chiapas
The argument of groups opposing Plan
"The Merida Initiative is characterized by a lack of a human rights perspective, a human security approach that mistakes the security of states for the security of human beings ... It is time for the international community to stop supporting short-sighted policies such as this one."
The Need for a Better Plan
At this critical juncture, the Merida Initiative would be a potentially devastating step backwards.
Despite the gravity of
Faced with a real problem-the strength of drug cartels in
Before putting the army in the streets-with all the legal, political, and practical risks that entails-the dramatic increase in drug use in
The priority should be to develop national plans and mechanisms of binational coordination that work, and whose side effects-like militarization, human rights abuses, and the sophistication of criminal elements-do not cancel out the benefits. If anything is known about arming conflict, it's that no matter which side you arm-and the guns invariably end up on both sides-it escalates violence.
The sheer scope of the Merida Initiative reflects the Bush administration's military/police focus in international security issues, just when those strategies have hit a low point in popularity within the
Major human rights organizations in
1. Available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/5118.
2. See Carlsen, Laura "Plan Mexico," FPIF, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4684.
3. See Laura Carlsen, "Deep Integration: The Anti-Democratic Expansion of NAFTA," http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4276.
4. See http://americas.irc-online.org/am/5178 for an analysis of this meeting.
5. "National Security Strategy Sept. 2002," http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
6. Thomas Shannon, Speech to the Council on the
7. Shannon stated this explicitly in the above speech: "Both
8. Rydell & Evering, "Controlling Cocaine, Prepared for the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the United States Army," (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation Study 1994, summary available online at http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/Cocaine-Supply-Demand1994.htm.
9. The initiative includes $30 million dollars to the Secretary of Health to establish a central intelligence computer system for national drug treatment centers. None of this money goes to patients or to expand services.
10. Smyth, Frank, "Drug War Blues," 2001: $1.3 billion in military aid that the
12. On-line at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100646.htm.
13. Cited in James Verini.
14. "Detalla la PGR lista de armas decomisadas," Andrea Becerril, La Jornada, Mar. 19, 2008.
15. As reported by Reuters, Feb.5, 2008.
16. Interview with Blanche Petrich, La Jornada, July 30, 2007, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/07/30/index.php?section=politica&article=005e1pol.
17. Author's interview with General José Francisco Gallardo, April 9. 2008.
18. Cited in a similar position of the
19. See the recent report by the International Civil Commission on Human Rights at http://cciodh.pangea.org/?q=es/node/207.
20. Laura Carlsen, "Militarizing Mexico: The New War on Drugs," (
21. Andrea Becerril and Víctor Ballinas, "Inconstitucional, cuerpo de elite para tareas policiacas: González Garza," La Jornada, October 5, 2007, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2007/05/10/inconstitucional-cuerpo-de-elite-para-tareas-policiacas-gonzalez-garza.
22. See the excellent 2004 report by the Latin American Working Group, the Center for International Policy, and the Washington Office on Latin America, "Blurring the Lines: Trends in U.S. Military Programs in Latin America," http://ciponline.org/facts/0410btl.pdf.
23. The author Laura Carlsen formed part of the Sixth Visit of the International Civil Commission on Human rights in
24. CPJ, online at http://www.cpj.org/impunityindex/index.html.
25. Note the following clauses (italics by author): Group 1:1: "These aircraft [2 Cessna Citation, cost: $2,800,000 with training, upgrades, and monitoring] are mission-critical to Mexico's interception of aerial trafficking and to reducing the flows of drugs, arms or other illicit cargo across our shared border" (immigrants are clearly identified as illicit cargo in the initiative); * $104,000,000 for 8 Bell helicopters, with training, maintenance, parts, and night vision equipment, "will improve SEDENA's ability to quickly deploy rapid reaction forces, which is essential for the successful interdiction of drugs arms and persons." * $91,757,0000 to Mexican Migration Institute (INAMI) for IT equipment "to track all persons entering and exiting Mexico as well as internal INAMI checkpoints ... It will also be used to track the entries and exits of repatriated Central Americans." It also provides for biometrically-based temporary working documents for Guatemalans in
26. Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93817.htm.
27. See Kent Paterson, "Juarez Mothers Demand Justice for their Murdered Daughters," www.americaspolicy.org.
28. See Drug Policy
29. Andrea Becerril and José Antonio Román, "Proteger del terrorismo" a EU, otro fin de la Iniciativa Mérida," La Jornada, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/10/25/index.php?section=politica&article=003n1pol.
30. Eric Schmitt and David Rohde, "Reports Assail State Department on Iraq Security,"
31. Thomas Donnelley, "Homeland Defense and the U.S. Military," Nov. 1, 2004, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21484/pub_detail.asp.
32. Stephen Johnson, "New Security Challenges in the
34. CCIODH report http://cciodh.pangea.org.
35. Two youth were killed and dozens beaten by state and federal police. Women rounded up in paddy wagons were abused, raped, and tortured en route to prison. Their horror stories are documented and corroborated by medical examiners and human rights organizations including Amnesty International. Instead of prosecuting the security forces responsible for the acts, the government sentenced two leaders and the lawyer of the grassroots movement to 67 years in prison.
36. On-line at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100646.htm.
Laura Carlsen (lcarlsen(@)ciponline.org) is director of the
Laura Carlsen, "A Primer on Plan
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